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A will, containing both specific devises and a devise of the residue
of the estate to private persons, and a codicil, confirming the specific
devises but devising the residue to the State of Missouri, were admitted
to probate in common form, ex parte and without notice to interested
persons.1 The residue included a remainder in real property. The residuary
devisees under the will commenced a contest of the codicil in the circuit
court on grounds of undue influence and lack of testamentary capacity.2
At suit of the Attorney General the Missouri Supreme Court issued a
writ of prohibition forbidding trial of the contest on the ground that the
State was a necessary party defendant which, by reason of sovereign im-
munity, could not be joined without its own consent.3
To the extent that it has not been modified by the federal and state
constitutions and statutes or by its inapplicability to local conditions, the law
in force in England in 1607 is the law of Missouri.4 It thus becomes ma-
*Professor of Law, University of Missouri.
1. Probate in common form, ex parte, without notice to interested parties,
is authorized by §§ 473.017, .023, RSMo 1959. Notice is given after the grant of
letters testamentary. § 473.033, RSMo 1959.
2. This is the procedure for contest of a will which has been admitted to
probate in common form by a probate court. § 473.083, RSMo 1959.
3. State v. Hall, 389 S.W.2d 798 (Mo. En Banc 1965). The state had
appeared specially in the circuit court and moved to dismiss the contest on the
grounds that it had not been served with process and that it had not waived its
sovereign immunity. The circuit court dismissed the state as a party but refused
to dismiss the contest otherwise, on this motion and a subsequent motion filed
by a specific devisee. The Missouri Supreme Court gave very little attention to
whether failure to serve the State would be a ground for prohibition. Section
473.083, RSMo 1959 provides for dismissal of a will contest on motion if all
parties defendant are not served within sixty days "in the absence of a showing
by the plaintiff of good cause for failure to secure and complete service." As the
quoted language has been held to confer discretion on the circuit court, it would
seem that failure to serve within the prescribed period does not ipso facto de-
prive the circuit court of jurisdiction. Hanna v. Sheetz, 205 S.W.2d 955 (K.C. Mo.
App. 1947). See Gresham v. Talbot, 326 Mo. 517, 31 S.W.2d 766 (1930). Cf. Cole
v. Smith, 370 S.W.2d 307 (Mo. 1963), discussed in Fratcher, Trusts and Succession
in Missouri, 30 Mo. L. REv. 82, 90 (1965); Blatt v. Haile, 291 S.W.2d 85 (Mo.1956).4. § 1.010, RSMo 1959; Osborne v. Purdome, 244 S.W.2d 1005 (Mo. En
Banc 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 953, rehearing denied, 343 U.S. 988 (1952); Gil-
lilan v. Gillilan, 278 Mo. 99, 212 S.W. 348 (1919); Duke v. Harper, 66 Mo. 51(1877).
(127)
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terial to examine the scope of the doctrine of sovereign immunity from
suit in English law and the way in which this doctrine has been applied
by American courts.
Prior to 1858 there was no such thing as probate of a will devising
real property in England. Like a grantee under a deed, the devisee under
a will of real property simply took possession of the devised land on the
death of the testator. If the heir of the testator or a devisee under a dif-
ferent will of the same testator wished to challenge the possessor's title,
he brought an action of ejectment and the issue of the validity of the
will under which the defendant claimed was litigated in that action. Suits
to establish and construe wills of real property were sometimes conducted
in equity.5
Under the rules of the feudal system, a feudal lord could not be
sued in his own court without his permission. Consequently, the king
could not be made a defendant in a royal court without his consent.0
If it was necessary to sue the king, the proper procedure was by petition
of right. If the king endorsed the petition with his fiat the action was
then conducted substantially like an action against a private person;
if the king refused his fiat, the action could not proceed.7 In modern
times, the king granted or denied the fiat on the advice of the Secre-
tary of State for the Home Department, who consulted the Junior Counsel
to the Treasury and the Attorney-General before tendering his advice.8
5. SHEPPARD, GRAND ABRIDGMENT, Part IV, p. 98 (1675); SWINBURNE ON
TESTAMENTS 122 (1635); WILLIAMS ON EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS 6. 320-21(3rd Am. ed., 1849); THEOBALD ON WILLS 71, 75 (5th ed., 1900). A devise of real
property was looked upon as a conveyance by way of appointment. A will dispos-
ing of both real and personal property could be admitted to probate, but, until
1858, the probate had no effect as to real property. Court of Probate Act, 1857,
20 & 21 Vict. c. 77, § 63, was interpreted as extending the binding effect of such a
probate to real property. Beardsley v. Beardsley, 1 Q.B. 746 (1899). The Land
Transfer Act, 1897, 60 & 61 Vict. c. 65, § 1(3), authorized probate of a will which
disposed only of real property.
6. The King v. The Abbot of Shrewsbury, SELECT CASES IN THE EXCHEQUER
CHAMBER (Selden Society Vol. 64) 102, 104 (1485); In the Goods of His Majesty
King George the Third, Deceased, 1 Add. 255, 162 Eng. Rep. 89 (1822); WATKINS,
THE STATE AS A PARTY LITIGANT 7-13 (1927).
7. SHEPPARD, GRAND ABRIDGMENT, Part III, pp. 77, 87-89 (1675); 9 HOLDS-
wORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 7-45 (1926); ANSON, LAW AND CUSTOM OF THlE
CONSTITUTION, Vol. II, Pt. II, 334-38 (4th ed. 1935); WATKINS, THE STATE AS A
PART' LITIGANT 16-31 (1927); Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers:
Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARv. L. REV. 1-9 (1963).
8. Petitions of Right Act, 1860, 23 & 24 Vict. c. 34, §§ 1-3; 9 HALSBURY'S
LAWS OF ENGLAND 694 (2d ed. 1933). The Crown Proceedings Act, 1947, 10 & 11
Geo. 6, c. 44, §§ 1, 2, permits suits to be maintained against the king and govern-
ment departments without the consent of the king or anyone else. Consequently,
it is no longer necessary to proceed by petition of right.
[Vol. 31
2
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 1 [1966], Art. 15
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol31/iss1/15
IMMUNITY IN PROBATE PROCEEDINGS
It is accepted doctrine that the king was under a duty to grant the
fiat if the petition stated a cause of action,9 and there is reason to believe
that a Home Secretary who advised denial of the fiat without good cause
would be liable in damages to the petitioner.10
Although the king could not be made a defendant in his own court
without his consent, the rule did not extend to appeals. If the king was
a plaintiff or otherwise a party in the trial court, a losing private party
could make the king a defendant to a writ of error without the king's
permission." When, on the death of a subject, the king became entitled
to real property of the deceased by escheat, forfeiture or devise, the old
procedure for establishing the king's title was by inquest of office.' 2 This
9. Ryves v. Duke of Wellington, 9 Beav. 579, 599, 50 Eng. Rep. 467, 475
(1846); Re Nathan, [1884] 12 Q.B. 461, 474; Dyson v. Attorney-General, [1911]
1 K.B. 410, 421-22 (C.A.).
10. Greenwood, The Liability of Crown Officers for Advising Refusal of the
Fiat, 8 McGILL L.J. 134 (1962).
11. The Queen v. Paty, 2 Salk. 504, 91 Eng. Rep. 431 (1705); Lloyd v.
Skutt, 1 Dougl. 350, 99 Eng. Rep. 225 (1780); O'Connell v. The Queen, 11 CI. &
Fin. 155, 8 Eng. Rep. 1061 (1844). Accord, Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.)
264, 406-12 (1821); Bannard v. New York State Natural Gas Corp., 404 Pa. 269,
172 A.2d 306 (1961); State v. Moore, 77 W.Va. 325, 87 S.E. 367 (1915). There
were some exceptions in criminal cases. Crawle v. Crawle, 1 Vein. 170, 23 Eng.
Rep. 393 (1683); The Queen v, Paty, supra.
This question points to a problem which is basic in the whole field of
sovereign immunity. Virtually all judicial proceedings, original and appellate, were
instituted by writs running in the king's name. Originally all or most of them
were ex gratia, that is, they were issued only if the king or some senior officer to
whom he had delegated discretion, chose to approve. Eventually nearly all of
them became de cursu, that is, they were issued by an inferior clerk, who had no
discretion at all and was bound to issue a writ when tendered the prescribed fee.
VAN CAENEGEM, ROYAL WRITS IN ENGLAND FROM THE CONQUEST TO GLANVILL
206-53 (Selden Society Vol. 77, 1959). See also, TURNER, ed., BREVIA PLACITATA
xlviii-lix (Selden Society Vol. 66, 1951). It is understandable that writs running
in the king's name which commanded the king himself to act should remain ex
gratia longer than most others and that humble petitions should be addressed to
the king for the issuance of such writs long after they had actually become de
cursu. Even the petition of right procedure had really become de cursu long be-
fore the formal requirement of the king's fiat was abolished by statute in 1947.
Supra notes 7-10.
The nineteenth century American judges who developed the doctrine of
sovereign immunity here either did not realize, or did not wish to understand,
that the requirement of the king's consent to litigation was often a mere fiction,
such as the fiction that the President of the United States has personally authorized
all of the judicial process issued by courts-marital in his name. E.g., MANUAL FOR
COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES 1951 559, 563 (1951).
12. 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *258-60; FINCH, LAW 323-35 (1759); 4
COKE, INSTITUTES *196-98, 225-26; THOMAS, NOTES TO COKE'S REPORTS, Vol. I, p.
106, note T2 (1826). Crown grants and leases made before completion of the
inquest proceedings are void under Stat. 18 Hen. 6, c. 6 (1439). For the early
development of these proceedings, see VAN CAENEGEM, ROYAL WRITS IN ENGLAND
FROM THE CONqUEST TO GLANVILL 61-81 (Selden Society Vol. 77, 1959).
1966]
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was a quasi-judicial administrative proceeding conducted by an escheator
or a special commission, assisted by a jury. Like the modern coroner's
inquest, this type of proceeding -did not have definite parties or service
of process. If the king's officers seized land under color of their offices
'without an inquest of office, the disseisee could maintain an assize of novel
disseisin against the officers, without royal consent.' 8 If there was an
inquest of office, a private person claiming the land adversely to the king
had several possible remedies. If he relied upon facts found by inquest,
he could proceed against the king by monstrans de droit.'4 If he denied
the facts found by the inquest, he could proceed against the king by
traverse.15 In either case, the king's consent was not needed, probably
because these proceedings were looked upon as appeals from the inquest.
Thus a private person claiming land which had belonged to a deceased
person adversely to the king almost always had a complete remedy with-
out the king's permission.
English officials have not forgotten the fate of Sir Richard Empson
and Edmund Dudley, the lawyers who served King Henry VII as com-
missioners of escheats. Some of their noteworthy success in getting land
for the king appears to have been due to their arbitrary methods of de-
priving interested persons of the opportunity to traverse inquests of
office. The popular outcry against them was so great that King Henry
VIII found it politically expedient to order the beheading of his father's
13. Statute of Westminster I, 3 Edw. 1, c. 24 (1275); 2 COKE, INSTITUTES
*206. The plaintiff could recover the rents and profits from the time of the wrong-
ful seizure. Articuli Super Chartas, 28 Edw. 1, stat. 3, c. 19 (1300).
14. Ormonde v. The King, SELECT CASES IN THE EXCHEQUER CHAMBER(Selden Society Vol. 64) 138 (1489); 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *260; FINCH,
LAW 324-25 (1759); SHEPPARD, GRAND ABRIDOMENT, Part III, 78-80 (1675);
THOMAS, NOTES TO COKE'S REPORTS, Vol. I, p. 125, note 4, Vol. II, p. 428, note
B (1826); WATKINS, THE STATE AS A PARTY LITIGANT 14-16 (1927).
15. Champernon v. The King, SELECT CASES IN THE EXcHEQUER CHAMBER(Selden Society Vol. 51) 29 (1426); Stats. 34 Edw. 3, c. 14 (1360), 36 Edw. 3,
c. 13 (1362), 2 & 3 Edw. 6, c. 8 (1548); 2 COKE, INSTITUTES *689; BLACKSTONE,
COKE, FINcH, SHEPPARD, THOMAS, WATKINS, supra notes 12 and 14.
Sections 470.060-.160, RSMo 1959, originally enacted in 1824, authorize pro.
ceedings which resemble the inquest of office to determine the right of the state to
lands by escheat. The prosecuting attorney files an information in behalf of the state
in the circuit court. Persons claiming an interest adversely to the state may
traverse or deny the facts stated in the information" and may appeal from ajudgment in favor of the state. This scheme provides adequate protection to
heirs at law but it would seem that a devisee could not maintain a traverse unless
the will under which he claims has been admitted to probate. Farris v. Burchard,
242 Mo. 1, 145 S.W. 825 (1912). If the probate court has made a common form
decree of intestacy, it would seem to follow from State v. Hall, supra note 3, that
the will could not thereafter be admitted to probate although unquestionably valid.
[Vol. 31
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faithful and profitable servants.'6 The recent decision in State V. Hall17
involved precisely the elements which roused the popular fury against
Empson and Dudley: (1) the state asserts title to land, theretofore privately
owned, in an ex parte proceeding of which no notice is given; (2) the
citizen who is deprived of his claim to the land, without notice or any
opportunity to be heard, is not allowed to appeal.
The transfer of the English rules to this country has involved several
difficulties. First, inquest of office has not been used so monstrans de droit
and traverse have not been available. Second, there being no king to
give the royal fiat, there has been a tendency to hold that the consent of
a state to suit against itself must be given by statute.'8 Although the assize
of novel disseisin has not ordinarily been available, it has usually been
held that, in the absence of a substitute remedy created by statute, a
citizen whose lands have been seized by state officers without lawful
authority may maintain ejectment against the officers as individuals with-
out the consent of the state.19 Similarly, an injunction against a threatened
unlawful seizure of property by state officers usually may be secured
without the consent of the state to the maintenance of the suit.2 ° Moreover,
16. 4 COKE, INsTITUTEs *196-98; 1 CoBBar's STATE TRIALS 286 (1809).
Empson and Dudley's methods, principally holding inquests of office secretly and
excluding all testimony unfavorable to the king, were prohibited by Stat. 1 Hen.
8, c. 8 (1509). Like Al Capone, the offense for which Empson and Dudley were
prosecuted ("constructive treason") was not that which aroused popular in-
dignation against them.
17. Supra note 3.
18. Annot., 42 A.L.R. 1464 (1926); Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and
Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HAv. L. REv. 1, 19-21 (1963).
19. The leading case is United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882). See also
Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U.S. 204 (1897); King v. Harris, 134 Ark. 337, 203 S.W. 847
(1918); St. Mary Parish Land Co. v. State Mineral Bd., 167 So.2d 509 (La. App.
1964); Weyler v. Gibson, 110 Md. 636, 73 At. 261 (1909); Bannard v. New York
State Natural Gas Corp., 404 Pa. 269, 172 A.2d 306 (1961); State v. Lain, 349
S.W.2d 579 (Tex. 1961); Annot., 108 Am. St. Rep. 838 (1906), Am. & Eng. Cas.
1913C 357 (1913), 44 L.R.A. (n.s.) 210 (1913), 160 A.L.R. 332 (1946); WATKINS,
THE STATE AS A PARTY LITIGANT 98-116 (1927). See Anselmo v. Cox, 135 Conn. 78,
60 A.2d 767 (1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 859 (1948); Roddy v. State, 65 Idaho
137, 139 P.2d 1005 (1943) (suit to quiet title); McKeown v. Brown, 167 Iowa 489,
149 N.W. 593 (1914); Richardson v. Liberty Oil Co., 143 La. 130, 78 So. 326
(1921), writ of error dismissed, 250 U.S. 648 (1921); Dunne v. State, 162 Md.
274, 159 At. 751 (1932), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 564 (1932); Tebbs v. Platte County,
325 Mo. 304, 308, 28 S.W.2d 656, 657 (1930); McCarty v. Clark County, 101 Mo.
179, 183, 14 S.W. 51 (1890). Cf. Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643 (1962); Luttrell v.
State Highway Commn, 379 S.W.2d 137 (St. L. Mo. App. 1964).
20. The leading case is Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 738 (1824). See also Weiland v. Pioneer Irr. Co., 259 U.S. 498 (1922);
Pub. Serv. Co. v. Corboy, 250 U.S. 153 (1919); Greene v. Louisville & I.R. Co.,
244 U.S. 499 (1917); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Andrews, 216 U.S. 165 (1910); Ex
parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U.S. 1 (1891);
1966]
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there are a number of recent decisions that the state itself may be sued
to recover property unlawfully seized, or its value, without any further
consent than that given by the due process and just compensation clauses
of the federal and state constitutions. 2' The doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity has been applied in this country chiefly to shield the states from
liability on bonds issued to finance "internal improvement" schemes which
proved to be unwise and a rebellion which was unsuccessful. 22 This use of
the doctrine was a phenomenon of the nineteenth century and it was
aimed mainly at nonresident speculators who bought up depreciated state
Davis v. Gray, 83 U.S. 203 (1873); Engelhardt v. Jenkins, 141 So.2d 193 (Ala.
1962); State Road Dep't v. Tharp, 146 Fla. 745, 1 So.2d 868 (1941); State Road
Dep't v. Harvey, 142 So.2d 773 (Fla. App. 1962); Murdock v. Perkins, 219 Ga.
756, 135 S.E.2d 869 (1964); Carson v. Sullivan, 284 Mo. 353, 223 S.W. 571 (1920);
Bohannon v. Camden Bend Drainage Dist., 240 Mo. App. 492, 208 S.W.2d 794
(1948); City of E. Orange v. Palmer, 82 N.J. Super. 258, 197 A.2d 410 (1964); Phil-
adelphia Life Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 410 Pa. 571, 190 A.2d 111 (1963); White
Eagle v. Gunderson, 48 S.D. 608, 205 N.W. 614 (1925); Griffin v. Hawn, 341
S.W.2d 151 (Tex. 1960); Annot., 43 A.L.R. 408 (1926); Annot., 44 L.R.A. (n.s.)
206 (1913); WATKINS, THE STATE AS A PARTY LITIGANT 98-116 (1927); Jaffe,
Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARv. L. REv.
1, 21-29 (1963). See, Southall v. Stricas, 153 So.2d 234 (Ala. 1963); Trippe v.
Port of New York Authority, 14 N.Y.2d 119, 198 N.E.2d 585, 249 N.Y.S.2d 409(1964); Shingleton v. State, 133 S.E.2d 183 (N.C. 1963).
21. State v. Hollis, 93 Ariz. 200, 379 P.2d 750 (1963); Bacich v. Board of
Control, 23 Cal.2d 343, 144 P.2d 818 (1944); Boxberger v. State Highway Dep't,
126 Colo. 438, 250 P.2d 1007 (1952); State v. Geiger & Peters, Inc., 196 N.E.2d
740 (Ind. 1964); Commonwealth v. Kelley, 314 Ky. 581, 236 S.W.2d 695 (1951);
Bernard v. State Dep't of Pub. Works, 127 So.2d 774 (La. App. 1961); Cope v.
Louisiana Live Stock Sanitary Bd., 176 So. 657 (La. App. 1937); Michalski v.
United States, 49 N.J. Super. 104, 139 A.2d 324 (1958); Sale v. State Highway
and Pub. Works Comm'n, 242 N.C. 612, 89 S.E.2d 290 (1955); Tomasek v. State,
248 P.2d 703 (Ore. 1952); Makela v. State, 205 A.2d 813 (Vt. 1964); Morris v.
Elizabeth River Tunnel Dist., 203 Va. 196, 123 S.E.2d 398 (1962). See Angelle v.
State, 212 La. 1069, 34 So.2d 321 (1948). Cf. State ex rel. State Park Bd. v. Tate,
295 S.W.2d 167 (Mo. En Banc 1956) (state can be sued without its consent for
partition); Youngstown Mines Corp. v. Prout, 124 N.W.2d 328 (Minn. 1963)(state can be sued without its consent for breach of mineral lease).
For the Missouri constitutional provisions, see note 41 infra.
22. Annots., 2 A.L.R.2d 677 (1948); 42 A.L.R. 1464 (1926); 44 L.R.A. (n.s.)
189 (1913); Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77
HAtv. L. REv. 1, 19 (1963); Pugh, Historical Approach to the Doctrine of
Sovereign Immunity, 13 LA. L. REv. 476, 481, 485 (1953).
The only authorities on the doctrine of sovereign immunity cited in the
opinion in State v. Hall, supra note 3, were Nacy v. Le Page, 341 Mo. 1039, 111
S.W.2d 25, (1937), and Kleban v. Morris, 363 Mo. 7, 247 S.W.2d 832 (1952).
Like the nineteenth century state bond cases in which the doctrine of sovereign
immunity received its greatest development, both of these cases involved attempts
to reach funds in the state treasury without legislative appropriation for the
purpose. They have little or no bearing on the question involved in State v. Hall,
that is, whether, when the State attempts to seize property in private hands, the
citizens who claim it are entitled to their day in court. The distinction between
these questions is made clear in the opinion of Mr. Justice Iredell in Chisholm v.
Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 439-40 (1793).
[Vol. 31
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bonds at a fraction of their face amount. The current trend is to abolish
the doctrine of sovereign immunity altogether, either by statute or by
judicial decision, so as to make the states subject to suit like private
corporations. 23
Prior to 1858 some three hundred seventy ecclesiastical courts had
exclusive jurisdiction in England over the probate of wills and the ap-
pointment of administrators of decedents' estates. 24 Their jurisdiction was
limited to personal property. Initial applications for grants of probate
or letters of administration were ordinarily conducted in common form,
ex parte, without definite parties and without notice. If there was a will
the executor -deposited it in the registry of the ecclesiastical court with
his affidavit that he believed it to be the last will and- testament of the
deceased and, if the will appeared to be in proper form, a grant of probate
was issued to him without more. If there was no will, the next of kin
entitled to administration filed an affidavit and bond and was issued
letters of administration. If, within thirty years, someone wished to con-
test the will or the appointment of the personal representative, he could
do so by a suit in the ecclesiastical court. In such case interested parties,
including the legatees under a contested- will, had to be served with
citations. If such a party could not be served, the suit could proceed without
him but he would not be bound by the decree.
25
23. By judicial decision: Souza & McCue Constr. Co. v. Superior Ct., 20 Cal.
Reptr. 634, 370 P.2d 338 (1962); Colorado Racing Comm'n v. Brush Racing
Ass'n, 316 P.2d 582 (Colo. 1957); Ace Flying Serv., Inc. v. Colorado Dep't of
Agriculture, 136 Colo. 19, 314 P.2d 278 (1957); George & Lynch, Inc. v. State,
197 A.2d 734 (Del. 1964). See Spaur v. City of Greeley, 372 P.2d 730 (Colo.
1962); State v. Shinkle, 373 P.2d 674 (Ore. 1962). By statute: e.g., 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346; ARxz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-821 (1956); CALIF. GoV'T CODE § 945 (1964
Supp.); Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 44.020-.160 (1962); LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 5101-10 (1964
Supp.); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN., c. 258, § 1 (1959); MICH. COMP. LAws §§ 691.101-
.151 (1948); NEB. REv. STAT. § 24-319 (1964); N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8 (McKinney's
N.Y. Consol. Laws, Vol. 29A, Pt. 2, 1963); CODE OF VA., 1950, §§ 8-38, 8-40 (1957
ed.). The doctrine of sovereign immunity was abolished in England by the Crown
Proceedings Act, 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, c. 44, 88 1, 2, except that, by § 40(1), the
Queen may not be sued for torts committed by her personally. For the Australian
legislation, see Kennedy, Suits By and Against the Crown, 6 CAN. BAR REV. 329,
334 (1928). See also Abbott, Abolition of Sovereign Immunity in Washington, 36
WASH. L. REv. 312 (1961); Dawn, Sovereign Immunity in Colorado, and the
Feasibility of Judicial Abrogation, 35 U. CoLo. L. REv. 529 (1963).
24. 4 COKE, INsTrrUTES *335-341; 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *488-519;
3 Id. *61-68; SHEPPARD, GRAND ABRIDGMENT, Part IV, 98 (1675); SWINBURNE ON
TESTAMENTS, Part VI, p. 69 (1635); FLOYER, PROCTOR'S PRACTICE IN THE Ec-
CLESIASTICAL COURTS 1-31 (1746); Ryves v. Duke of Wellington, 9 Beav. 579, 50
Eng. Rep. 467 (1846). For a list of these ecclesiastical courts, see NICOLAS, NoTrrIA
HISTORICA 142-204 (1824).
25. Drewitt v. Drewitt, 58 L.T. 684, 52 J.P. 232 (1888).
1966]
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When a person was found to have died intestate without next of
kin, the king was entitled to his personal property as bona vacantia and
the king's nominee was appointed administrator. After such a common
form appointment a person claiming to be next of kin or executor under
a will could bring suit in the ecclesiastical court to secure revocation of
the letters of administration issued to the king's nominee. Despite the
fact that the king was the real party in interest, his consent was not
required for the maintenance of such a suit.20 Moreover, it would seem
that if the king was legatee under a will admitted to probate in common
form, ,the next of kin could contest the will without the king's consent.
This is indicated by the proceedings relative to John Camden Neild,
the famous Chelsea miser who died in 1852 leaving a will which be-
queathed the residue of his estate, some £500,000, to Queen Victoria.=
On application of the executors, the will was admitted to probate in
common form on October 21, 1852. The next of kin commenced a suit
to contest the will and they were allowed to proceed to trial, the common
26. Kane v. Maule, 2 Sm. & Giff. 331, 65 Eng. Rep. 423 (1854), aff'd sub.
mm. Kane v. Reynolds, 4 De G., M. & G. 565, 43 Eng. Rep. 628 (1854); Parting-
ton v. Reynolds, 6 W.R. 615 (1858); Atkinson v. Her Majesty's Proctor, L.R. 2
P. & D. 255 (1871).
Moreover, even if the estate did pass to the king as bona vacantia, creditors
of the deceased could enforce their claims against it. Magit v. Johnson, 2 Doug.
K.B. 542, 99 Eng. Rep. 344 (1780); Bourne, Bona Vacantia-Thle Crown's Liability
for Debts of Deceased-Rights of Creditors, 27 CAN. BARu RaV. 592 (1949). The
plaintiff in Iz re Blake [1932J 1 Ch. 54, claiming as next of kin, sought by petition
of right to secure funds which were paid over to the Crown as bona vacantia in
1883 and mingled with public funds. It was held that she was barred by the
statute of limitations.
It will be recalled that there was no probate of wills of land prior to 1858
but that they could be proved in equity. Supra note 5. In Reeve v. Attorney-Gen-
eral, 2 Atk. 223, 26 Eng. Rep. 538 (1741), the owner of land died without heirs,
leaving a will. The Attorney-General contended that the will was invalid and
that, consequently, the land had escheated to the king. The court held that the
beneficiaries under the will could maintain a suit in equity against the Attorney-
General to establish the validity of the will. Accord, Burney v. Macdonald, 15 Sim.
6, 60 Eng. Rep. 518 (1845); Rittson v. Stordy, 3 Sm. & Giff. 230, 65 Eng. Rep.
637 (1855), aff'd, 2 Jur. (n.s.) 410 (1856).
In Kitchener v. Kitchener, 18 L.J. Ch. (1849), legatees of personal property
under a will were permitted to join the Attorney-General as a party defendant
to a suit in equity for administration of the estate, when he claimed that the
interest of one of the legatees had passed to the queen by forfeiture. This, of
course, would result in a decree of distribution determining whether or not the
queen did take.
See, also, Dyson v. Attorney-General, [19111 1 K.B. 410 (CA.).
27. 20 L.T. App. ii (Sept. 25, 1852)..
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form probate having been revoked accordingly. The contest failed and
the will was admitted to probate in solemn form on February 17, 1853.28
There would seem to be three reasons why the king's consent was
not required to a suit to contest a will or revoke letters of administration
naming him as a defendant. First, prior to the Reformation, the ecclesi-
astical courts were not royal courts; an appeal from them lay, in theory
at least, to the Papal Curia in Rome and the Pope was, or claimed to be,
the feudal overlord, of the king.29 The statute of Henry VIII abolishing
appeals to Rome carefully preserved existing rights by permitting an ap-
peal to another tribunal in probate litigation to which the king was a
party.80 Second, common form probate proceedings and proceedings to
challenge the results reached in them are not ordinary adversary litigation.
Proponent and contestant may be nominal parties in the latter but both
are really ex parte proceedings to determine the status of a res. In this
they resemble very closely the inquest of office. As the Missouri Supreme
Court has said:
But proceedings in reference to the establishment or invalidat-
ing of a will stand on a different foundation from ordinary actions
28. Records of the Prerogative Court of the Province of Canterbury, Prin-
cipal Probate Registry, Somerset House, London. The will appointed the person
filling the office of Keeper of the Queen's Privy Purse as executor and the Hon-
orable Charles Beaumont Phipps received the common form grant of probate in
that capacity.
In Newland v. Attorney-General, 3 Meriv. 684, 36 Eng. Rep. 262 (1809), an
executor was permitted to maintain a suit in equity against the Attorney-General
to ascertain whether a bequest to the government for payment of the national
debt was valid and, if so, what he should do with it. He was instructed to dispose
of it as the king should direct. In Nightingale v. Goulburn, 5 Hare 484, 67 Eng.
Rep. 1003 (1847), aff'd, 2 Ph. 594, 41 Eng. Rep. 1072 (Ch. 1848), the next of kin
of a testator was allowed to maintain a suit in equity against the Chancellor of
the Exchequer for a determination that a bequest to the Chancellor on trust for
Great Britain established a resulting trust for the plaintiff. It was held that the
bequest created a valid charitable trust. In Ashton v. 'Lord Langdale, 15 Jur.
868 (1851), an executor was allowed to maintain a suit in equity against the
Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt to determine the validity
and effect of a bequest to them. The validity and effect of a bequest to the United
States was determined in equity in The President of the United States of America
v. Drummond (1838), referred to in Whicker v. Hume, 7 H.L.C. 124, 155, 11 Eng.
Rep. 124, 155 (1858).
29. Cf. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), holding, prior to
the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, that, although a private person could
not sue a state in its own courts without its consent, he could do so in the federal
courts.
30. Stat. 24 Hen. 8, c. 12, § 9 (1532). The King's suit for annulment of his
marriage to Catherine of Aragon was pending in the Papal Curia when this statute
was enacted. Appeals to the Papal Curia from the king's courts had been forbidden
long before. Stats. 27 Edw. 3, c. 1 (1353); 28 Edw. 3, Stat. 2, c. 1 (1363).
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at law or causes of action. They are of the nature of a proceeding
in rem, and simply amount to a revival of the same matter in the
Circuit Court which has been previously had in the County Court.
The same legal rules that govern the investigation in the County
Court apply in the Circuit Court. The heirs at law and devisees
are made nominal parties, but in truth the proceeding is ex
parte ... .s
Third, although, in modem English practice, the contestant of a will
admitted to probate in common form is called "plaintiff," the proceeding
is really an appeal from the common form decree of probate.3 2 This be-
comes evident when it is seen that the proponent, not the nominal plaintiff,
has the burden of proving testamentary capacity and due execution.83
Thus a will contest is very similar to the nonstrans de droit and the
traverse by means of which a private person could appeal from an inquest
of office without the king's fiat. Probate and appointment of an admin-
istrator have, in fact, replaced the inquest of office as the proceedings
by which the king establishes his title to real property of a deceased
person to which he has succeeded by devise or escheat s 4
31. Garvin's Adm'r v. Williams, 50 Mo. 206, 212 (1872). See also, Campbell
v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 346 Mo. 200, 139 S.W.2d 935 (1940); Ewart v.
Dalby, 319 Mo. 108, 5 S.W.2d 428 (1928); Bradford v. Blossom, 207 Mo. 177,
105 S.W. 289 (1907); Calnane v. Calnane, 223 Mo. App. 381, 17 S.W.2d 566
(1929).
32. For the modem English practice in probate and will contest proceedings,
which resembles very closely the old practice in the ecclesiastical courts and the
present practice in Missouri, see Fratcher, Fiduciary Administration in England,
40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 12, 49-56, 67-71 (1965).
33. Cleare v. Cleare, 1 P. & D. 655 (1869); Atter v. Atkinson, 1 P. & D.
668 (1869); Sukh Dei v. Kedar Noth, [1901] L.R. 28 Ind. App. 186 (P.C.);
TRISTRAM & CoomE, PROBATE PRACTICE 659 (21st ed. 1960). Moreover, the pro-
ponent, although nominally a defendant, has the usual plaintiff's right to open
and close. Cross v. Cross, 3 Sw. & Tr. 292, 164 Eng. Rep. 1287 (1864); Hutley
v. Grimstone, 5 P.D. 24 (1879). The contestants are only nominal plaintiffs,
Jackson v. Braithwaite, 63 L.T. 231 (C.A. 1890).
34. Court of Probate Act, 1857, 20 & 21 Vict. c. 77, §§ 3, 4, 23, 35, 61, 62,
63, 64, transferred jurisdiction over probate of wills and appointment of admin-
istrators from the ecclesiastical courts to a newly-established secular Court of
Probate. It also extended probate to include wills of land and provided for trial
by jury in will contests. Trial by jury was not used in the ecclesiastical courts
but it was the form of trial in the inquest of office and the action of eject-
ment, which were, before this act, the proceedings used to determine the validity
of wills of land. Intestate's Estates Act, 1884, 47 & 48 Vict. c. 71, § 5, explicitly
recognizes the right of the queen to establish title by escheat in the High Court
of Justice, which had by then acquired the jurisdiction of the Court of Probate,
without inquest of office. The act was careful to preserve the citizen's right to
appeal from any determination in favor of the queen made in proceedings which
were in substitution for the inquest of office. Escheat (Procedure) Act, 1887, 50
10
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Missouri procedure on will contests is almost identical in all respects
with the English. The will is first proved in common form, ex parte,
without parties or notice, in the probate court 3 5 A contest may then be
filed in the circuit court and all legatees under the contested will must
be made defendants and served with process.8 6 Although the contestant is
the nominal plaintiff, the burden of proof of testamentary capacity and
due execution is, as in England, on the proponent of the will.3T The Mis-
souri Supreme Court has held that, in a will contest, the circuit court is
a superior court of probate, not a court of law or equity, and that the
proceeding is in the nature of an appeal from the common form decree
of probate.3 8
As the doctrine of sovereign immunity is derived from English law,
it would seem that it ought not to apply in will contests in this country
& 51 Vict. c. 53, § 2, abolished inquests of office for escheats. See also, 22-3
Vict. c. 21, § 25 (1859); 33 & 34 Vict. c. 23 (1870).
Under the Administration of Estates Act, 1925, 15 Geo. 5, c. 23, H8 1, 30,
45, 46, title to both real and personal property passes to the executor or admin-
istrator, escheat is abolished, and, if the decedent died intestate without heirs, the
Treasury Solicitor is appointed administrator and distributes the net estate, in-
cluding both real and personal property, to the queen (that is, the public treasury),
as bona vacantia.
The Revised Statutes of Missouri still contain provisions for original proceed-
ings in the circuit court in the nature of an inquest of office to determine the
state's right to take land by escheat. Supra note 15. It is probable that these
provisions have been superseded by the Missouri Probate Code of, 1955, which
appears to confer exclusive original jurisdiction over descent and distribution of
lands of deceased persons upon the probate court in probate and administration
proceedings. §§ 472.010(11), 472.020, 473.087, 473.617, 473.663, RSMo 1959. See
Stowe v. Stowe, 140 Mo. 594, 41 S.W. 951 (1897). Cf. State ex inf. Kell v. Buchanan,
357 Mo. 750, 210 S.W.2d 359 (1948); Farris v. Burchard, 242 Mo. 1, 145 S.W.
825 (1912).
35. Supra note 1.
36. Supra note 2.
37. Buchholz v. Cunningham, 340 Mo. 302, 100 S.W.2d 446 (1937); Rock
v. Keller, 312 Mo. 458, 278 S.W. 759 (1926); Chambers v. Chambers, 297 Mo.
512, 249 S.W. 415 (1923); Lindsay v. Shaner, 291 Mo. 297, 236 S.W. 319 (1921);
Teckenbrock v. McLaughlin, 209 Mo. 533, 108 S.W. 46 (1908); Mowry v. Norman,
204 Mo. 173, 103 S.W. 15 (1907); Goodfellow v. Shannon, 197 Mo. 271, 95 S.W.
979 (1906); Cowan v. Shaver, 197 Mo. 203, 95 S.W. 200'(1906); Morton v.
Heidorn, .135 Mo. 608, 37 S.W. 504 (1896); McFadin v. Catron, 120 Mo. 252,
25 S.W. 506 (1894); Carl v. Gobel, 120 Mo. 283, 25 S.W. 214 (1894); Maddox v.
Maddox, 114 Mo. 35, 21 S.W. 499 (1893); Lamb v. Helm, 56 Mo. 420 (1874).
38. The leading case is Dickey v. Malechi, 6 Mo. 177 (1839). Accord, State
v. Strother, 289 S.W.2d 73 (Mo. En Banc 1956), discussed in Fratcher, Trusts and
Succession, 22 Mo. L. REv. 390, 403 (1957); Davis v. Davis, 252 S.W.2d 521
(Mo. 1952); Fletcher v. Ringo, 164 S.W.2d 904 (Mo. 1942); Harrell v. Harrell,
284 Mo. 218, 223 S.W. 919 (1920); Johnson v. Brewn, 277 Mo. 392, 210 S.W. 55
(1919); Teckenbrock v. McLaughlin, 209 Mo. 533, 108 S.W. 46 (1908); Rice v.
Rice, 239 Mo. App. 739, 197 S.W.2d 994 (1946); Schaff v. Peters, 111 Mo. App.
447, 90 S.W. 1037 (1905).
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if it did not in England, and the few reported American cases support this
view. In United States v. Fox,39 a will devising land to the United States
was presented for probate in a New York surrogate court. It was contested
by the heirs and denied probate by the New York courts. The Supreme
Court of the United States affirmed the state court judgment. The question
of sovereign immunity was squarely raised in Hogston, v. Bell,40 which
involved a will devising property to the State of Indiana. It was held
that the heirs could contest the will without the consent of the state.
The undesirability of the rule laid down by the Missouri Supreme
Court is manifest. There being no notice of common form probate and
no thorough examination of the handwriting incident to it, the probate
of a forged will is easy. According to the decision, if the state is a legatee,
such a will cannot be contested. Will forgers are being invited to insert
a five dollar bequest to the state in their product. Moreover, it would
seem to follow from the decision that, if the probate court, in an ex parte
common form proceeding, should determine that the deceased died in-
testate without heirs, so that his estate escheated to the state, neither
the heirs nor the proponents of a valid will could contest this determina-
tion in the circuit court. Perhaps creditors of the deceased could not file
claims.
The United States Supreme Court has held that a state statute
which permits a conclusive adjudication in a probate proceeding against
a person who has not been notified of the proceeding is invalid because
it denies due process of law.41 The decision in the instant case gives pre-
39. 94 U.S. 315 (1876).
40. 185 Ind. 536, 112 N.E. 883 (1916). In the following cases involving
legacies or devises to a state, private persons questioning the validity or effect
of the dispositions were allowed to do so in the normal course of litigation: State
v. Blake, 69 Conn. 64, 36 Ad. 1019 (1897) (collateral attack by state on decree
of distribution); Dickson v. United States, 125 Mass. 311 (1878) (executor's
suit for instructions); In re Beck's Estate, 44 Mont. 561, 121 Pac. 784 (1912)(declaratory judgment suit by state); Vestal v. Pickering, 125 Ore. 553, 267 Pac.
821 (1928) (suit by heir against executor for construction); In re Edge's Estate,
339 Pa. 67, 14 A.2d 293 (1940) (appeal from order of distribution); Bond v.
State, 45 Wyo. 133, 16 P.2d 53 (1932)- (declaratory judgment suit by state). In
In re Matysiak's Estate, 252 N.Y.S.2d 909, 43 Misc.2d 1063 (Sur. 1964), an ad-
ministratrix was allowed to maintain a discovery proceeding against a state agency.
In Succession of Rolland, 8 So.2d 546 (La. App. 1942), it was held that the state,
which claimed a mortgage on estate assets, could be joined as a -party in a
proceeding for distribution of an estate.
41. Scott v. McNeal, 154 U.S. 34 (1894). See also, Mullane v. Central Han.
over Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Levy, Probate in Common Form in
the United States: The Problem of Notice in Probate Proceedings, 1952 Wis. L.
Ruv. 420. Cf. Cunnius v. Reading School Dist., 198 U.S. 458 (1905); In re Estate
of Pierce, 245 Iowa 22, 60 N.W.2d 894 (1953).
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cisely this effect to the Missouri Probate Code. The due process of law
clauses of the American federal and state constitutions are derived from
a statute enacted in the reign of King Edward III, which declared
that no man of what estate or condition that he be, shall
be put out of land or tenement, nor taken, nor imprisoned- nor
disinherited, nor put to death, without being brought in answer
by due process of the law.4
The statute of Edward III is in force in Missouri.43 The decision in
State v. Hall44 appears to mean that any man may be put out of land
or disinherited without even being notified, much less "brought in answer
by due process of law."
Sir John Holt served with distinction for twenty-one years as Lord
Chief Justice of England. His courageous decisions outlawed slavery,45 put
an end to prosecutions for witchcrafi, 48 imposed liability on voting officials
who denied the franchise to qualified electors,47 and championed the
right of private persons to proceed against the Crown.48 If Chief Justice
Holt were to visit Missouri today it is likely that he would tell us, in
his blunt, forthright way, that the decision in State v. Hall49 was a travesty
of justice and a gross denial of due process of law. Would we listen or
would we ignore the old judge as an archaic crackpot with an absurd
prejudice against arbitrary tyranny?
42. 28 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1354). This was a great extension of the similar provision
of Magna Carta, 9 Hen. 3, c. 29 (1225), because the latter protected only freemen.
At that time some 88% of the population was unfree.
The Missouri Constitution of 1945 declares:
"That no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law." (Art. I, § 10);
"That private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without
just compensation." (Art. I, § 26.)
43. Supra note 4.
44. Supra note 3.
45. Smith v. Gould, 2 Ld. Raym. 1274, 92 Eng. Rep. 338 (1707); Smith v.
Browne, Holt. K.B. 495, 90 Eng. Rep. 1172 (1701); Chamberlain v. Harvey, 1 Ld.
Raym. 146, 91 Eng. Rep. 994 (1697).
46. Foss, BIOGRAPHIA JuRlucA 353-54 (1870).
47. Ashby v. White, 14 Howell's State Trials 779 (1704).
48. The Case of the Bankers, 14 Howell's State Trials 1, 29, 34-35 (1700),
discussed in Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity,
77 HARv. L. REv. 1, 7 (1963); The Queen v. Paty, 2 Salk. 503, 91 Eng. Rep. 431
(1705).
49. Supra note 3.
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